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WHEN LAW FREES US TO SPEAK 
Danielle Keats Citron** & Jonathon W. Penney* 
 
A central aim of online abuse is to silence victims. That effort is as 
regrettable as it is successful. In the face of cyberharassment and sexual-
privacy invasions, women and marginalized groups retreat from online 
engagement. These documented chilling effects, however, are not 
inevitable. Beyond its deterrent function, the law has an equally important 
expressive role. In this Article, we highlight law’s capacity to shape social 
norms and behavior through education. We focus on a neglected dimension 
of law’s expressive role: its capacity to empower victims to express their 
truths and engage with others. Our argument is theoretical and empirical.  
We present new empirical research showing cyberharassment law’s 
salutary effects on women’s online expression. We then consider the 
implications of those findings for victims of sexual-privacy invasions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2016, a cybermob descended upon Leslie Jones, the Ghostbusters 
actress and Saturday Night Live cast member.  Trolls and hackers targeted 
Jones with sexist and racist abuse.1  Tweets featured doctored photos of 
Jones with semen on her face.  Harassers compared Jones to an ape with 
menacing photos to match.  Jones’s website was hacked; its contents were 
replaced by photographs of her license and passport, fake nude photographs 
of Jones, and a video tribute to a dead zoo gorilla.2  Jones subsequently shut 
down her Twitter account.3  Friends described Jones as “rattled” and “shell-
shocked.”4 
Jones’s experience is reminiscent of far too many others.  In 2014, a 
hacker published more than 500 private sexually explicit images of female 
celebrities online, which had been stolen from victims’ email and iCloud 
 
 1. AMANDA LENHART ET AL., DATA & SOC’Y RESEARCH INST., NONCONSENSUAL IMAGE 
SHARING: ONE IN 25 AMERICANS HAS BEEN A VICTIM OF “REVENGE PORN” 3 (2016), 
https://datasociety.net/pubs/oh/Nonconsensual_Image_Sharing_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
28QW-28YK]; Abby Ohlheiser, Leslie Jones Was the Victim of a Hack, Reportedly 
Exposing Private Documents and Nude Photos, WASH. POST (Aug. 24, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2016/08/24/leslie-joness-website-
goes-offline-after-reportedly-being-hacked/ [https://perma.cc/VT6J-NXZ9]; Katie Rogers, 
Leslie Jones, Star of ‘Ghostbusters,’ Becomes a Target of Online Trolls, N.Y. TIMES (July 
19, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/20/movies/leslie-jones-star-of-ghostbusters-
becomes-a-target-of-online-trolls.html [https://perma.cc/FQ65-LDN5]. 
 2. Sandra Laville et al., The Women Abandoned to Their Online Abusers, GUARDIAN 
(Apr. 11, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/apr/11/women-online-
abuse-threat-racist [https://perma.cc/7LZF-KMEL] (explaining that comments on Black 
Lives Matter’s Facebook pages contain “racism, sexism, and homophobia”); Abby 
Ohlheiser, The Leslie Jones Hack Used All the Scariest Tactics of Internet Warfare at Once, 
WASH. POST (Aug. 26, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
intersect/wp/2016/08/26/the-leslie-jones-hack-used-all-the-scariest-tactics-of-internet-
warfare-at-once [https://perma.cc/ 
6BMT-YRJM] (explaining how women of color, in particular, are subjected to racism and 
sexism online). 
 3. LENHART ET AL., supra note 1, at 3; Rogers, supra note 1. 
 4. Maurice Cassidy, Leslie Jones Reacts to Nude Photos Leak:  Devastated by Scandal 
as Katy Perry Defends Comedienne’s Privacy, INQUISITR (Aug. 25, 2016), 
https://www.inquisitr.com/3451796/leslie-jones-reacts-to-nude-photos-leak-devastated-by-
scandal-as-katy-perry-defends-comediennes-privacy/ [https://perma.cc/8TT2-2DBN]. 
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accounts.5  Actress Jennifer Lawrence told Vanity Fair:  “I can’t even 
describe to anybody what it feels like to have my naked body shoot across 
the world like a news flash against my will.”6  She made clear that the 
publication of her nude photos without consent amounted to a “sexual 
violation.”7 
These attacks exemplify the online abuse that victims face.  Such attacks 
usually amount to cyberharassment or cyberstalking—the persistent 
targeting of an individual with threats, defamation, and privacy invasions 
that causes severe emotional distress or the fear of physical harm.8  Rape 
and death threats are common.9  Defamation typically involves allegations 
that victims are prostitutes or have sexually transmitted infections.10  
Privacy invasions typically implicate sexual privacy11 and involve 
“doxxing.”12 
Online abuse has a “totalizing and devastating impact” upon victims.13  
As one of us (Penney) has empirically proven, online abuse has a profound 
“chilling effect.”14  The central aim of online abuse is often to silence 
victims, to punish them for speaking out, and to drive them from public 
life.15  And, as this Article will explore, it works. 
 
 5. LENHART ET AL., supra note 1, at 3; Joseph Serna, Man Convicted of Hacking Gmail 
and iCloud Accounts of at Least 30 Celebrities in L.A., L.A. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2016), 
https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-phishing-scam-conviction-20160928-snap-
story.html [https://perma.cc/26U3-FWPT]. 
 6. LENHART ET AL., supra note 1, at 3; Sam Kashner, Both Huntress and Prey, VANITY 
FAIR (Nov. 2014), http://www.vanityfair.com/hollywood/2014/10/jennifer-lawrence-photo-
hacking-privacy [https://perma.cc/F64F-W32M]. 
 7. LENHART ET AL., supra note 1, at 3; Kashner, supra note 6. 
 8. DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 6–8 (2014); Mary Anne 
Franks, Sexual Harassment 2.0, 71 MD. L. REV. 655, 657–58 (2012).  See generally PEW 
RESEARCH CTR., ONLINE HARASSMENT (2014), http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-
content/uploads/sites/14/2014/10/PI_OnlineHarassment_72815.pdf [https://perma.cc/5QLU-
67TD]. 
 9. CITRON, supra note 8, at 5–6. 
 10. Id. at 24, 27, 46. 
 11. See generally Danielle Keats Citron, Sexual Privacy, 128 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 
2019). 
 12. Nellie Veronika Binder, From the Message Board to the Front Door:  Addressing 
the Offline Consequences of Race- and Gender-Based Doxxing and Swatting, 51 SUFFOLK U. 
L. REV. 55, 58 (2018). 
 13. CITRON, supra note 8, at 29; see also Citron, supra note 11 (manuscript at 43–44) 
(detailing examples of the impact and chilling effects of online abuse). 
 14. The term “chilling effects” describes the idea that certain actions, by public or 
private actors, may “chill or deter people from exercising their freedoms or engaging in legal 
activities.” Jonathon W. Penney, Chilling Effects:  Online Surveillance and Wikipedia Use, 
31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 117, 125–26 (2016) [hereinafter Penney, Chilling Effects]; see also 
Jonathon Penney, Internet Surveillance, Regulation, and Chilling Effects Online:  A 
Comparative Case Study, 6 INTERNET POL’Y REV., May 26, 2017, at 1, 3 [hereinafter Penney, 
Internet Surveillance].  For other important scholarly work on chilling effects, see NEIL 
RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY:  RETHINKING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 107, 
179–80, 185 (2015); Leslie Kendrick, Speech, Intent, and the Chilling Effect, 54 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1633, 1657 (2013); Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk, and the First Amendment:  
Unraveling the “Chilling Effect,” 58 B.U. L. REV. 685, 730–31 (1978). 
 15. CITRON, supra note 8, at 196 (speaking about the need for law to play a role where 
“one group of voices consciously exploits the Internet to silence others”); EMMA A. JANE, 
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Because online abuse disproportionately impacts women and 
marginalized communities, so does the silencing that it produces.16  As 
online abuse continues apace, women and marginalized groups are forced 
offline.17  This endangers deliberative democracy, which depends upon 
contributions from diverse voices and perspectives—particularly groups 
historically excluded from the “marketplace of ideas.”18 
These “chilling effects” are not inevitable.  As a start, we note that law 
has a crucial expressive function in combating online abuse.19  As one of us 
(Citron) has argued, law can teach us that cyberharassment is harmful, 
wrong, and illegal.20  Through its lessons, law can change the behavior of 
everyone involved in the legal process—the perpetrators themselves, law 
enforcers, judges, and victims.21 
In this Article, we shed light on a neglected dimension of law’s 
expressive role—its encouragement of victims to stay engaged online rather 
than retreating into silence.  We make both a theoretical and empirical case 
for these potential expressive effects, including new empirical research to 
 
MISOGYNY ONLINE:  A SHORT (AND BRUTISH) HISTORY 68–69 (2017) (discussing how 
“cyberhate” is used to silence women); Caitlin E. Lawson, Platform Vulnerabilities:  
Harassment and Misogynoir in the Digital Attack on Leslie Jones, 21 INFO. COMM. & SOC’Y 
818, 821 (2018) (noting how online harassment and abuse, including the Leslie Jones case, 
is deployed to silence women). 
 16. See CITRON, supra note 8, at 13–19; Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, 
Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345, 385 (2014) (“[T]he 
nonconsensual disclosure of a person’s sexually explicit images chills private 
expression . . . .”); Citron, supra note 11 (manuscript at 19); Mary Anne Franks, Beyond 
‘Free Speech for the White Man’:  Feminism and the First Amendment, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE (Cynthia Bowman & Robin West eds., 2019 
forthcoming) (manuscript at 29), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3206392 [https://perma.cc/UF9V-ZPS7] 
(“[E]vidence abounds of the chilling effects of harassment and other forms of abuse.”). 
 17. CITRON, supra note 8, at 1–4, 8–9; Danielle Keats Citron, Law’s Expressive Value in 
Combating Cyber Gender Harassment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 373, 374–75, 391 (2009); Ari 
Ezra Waldman, Social Safe Spaces, 96 WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 3–
4) (“Prominent women and members of other marginalized groups are leaving these spaces.  
That is not only regrettable; it is dangerous for democracy.”). 
 18. Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 102 (2009); Danielle 
Keats Citron & Neil M. Richards, Four Principles for Digital Expression (You Won’t 
Believe #3), 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 1353, 1365 (2018) (“[N]ot everyone can freely engage 
online.  This is especially true for women, minorities, and political dissenters who are more 
often the targets of cyber mobs and individual harassers.”); Citron, supra note 17, at 399 
(“Society suffers a great loss when it loses women from the online marketplace and 
discourse.”); Ari Ezra Waldman, The Marketplace of Fake News, 20 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 845, 
860 (2018) (“[T]he loss of this deep engagement can have deleterious effects on politics, 
policy, and democracy.”). 
 19. See generally Citron, supra note 17.  In this Article, we build on our prior work to 
develop the way we understand law’s expressive role and its actual impact on the ground. 
 20. Id. at 393, 408.  See generally Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 
144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996). 
 21. See, e.g., Jane Aiken & Katherine Goldwasser, The Perils of Empowerment, 20 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 139, 169 (2010); Citron, supra note 17, at 377, 411–12 (arguing 
that law can change how law enforcement sees and responds to online abuse, how judges 
sentence defendants, and how victims might see themselves as wronged and report online 
abuse to authorities). 
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support this claim.  We conclude by extending our analysis to laws 
combating invasions of sexual privacy.22  Our work aims to enrich 
expressive law theory and scholarship with empirical and theoretical work 
supporting law’s expressive role.23 
I.  THEORY AND PRACTICE 
Understanding the theory and practice of expressive law begins with 
asking very basic questions about the law.  Those questions include some of 
the most foundational:  Why do people follow the law?  What properties 
command or encourage that compliance? 
A.  Situating Expressive Theory 
Conversations about legal compliance have long followed diverging 
paths.24  For deterrence theorists, people comply with the law because 
ignoring it would be costly.25  Law, in other words, changes behavior by 
sheer force of coercion.  For legitimacy theorists, people obey the law 
because they view law as worthy of their compliance.26  Said another way, 
people comply with law’s mandates because they view law as legitimate. 
Scholars who emphasize law’s expressive role, as we do, have joined this 
long-running debate.27  While scholars have long explored law’s expressive 
power,28 more recent work has illuminated law’s impact on human 
behavior.29  Expressive theorists argue that law shapes social norms by 
changing the social meaning of behavior.30  Law educates us about what is 
 
 22. See Citron, supra note 11 (manuscript at 54–60). 
 23. See, e.g., Yuval Feldman, The Expressive Function of Trade Secret Law:  Legality, 
Cost, Intrinsic Motivation, and Consensus, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 177, 178–79 (2009); 
Emily Ryo, On Normative Effects of Immigration Law, 13 STAN. J.C.R. & C.L. 95, 101–02 
(2017); Susan Yeh, Laws and Social Norms:  Unintended Consequences of Obesity Laws, 81 
U. CIN. L. REV. 173, 174 (2012). 
 24. See Alex C. Geisinger & Michael Ashley Stein, Expressive Law and the Americans 
with Disabilities Act, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1061, 1061–62 (2016). 
 25. Id. at 1061.  See, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, THE FORCE OF LAW (2015); Raymond 
Paternoster, How Much Do We Really Know About Criminal Deterrence?, 100 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 765, 770 (2010). 
 26. See Geisinger & Stein, supra note 24, at 1061; see also TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE 
OBEY THE LAW 19–70 (1990); Janice Nadler, Flouting the Law, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1399, 1402, 
1404–10 (2005). 
 27. RICHARD H. MCADAMS, THE EXPRESSIVE POWERS OF LAW:  THEORIES AND LIMITS 4 
(2015); Geisinger & Stein, supra note 24, at 1062. 
 28. See, e.g., THURMAN ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 34 (1962) (explaining 
that law is a “reservoir of emotionally important social symbols”); Carol Weisbrod, On the 
Expressive Functions of Family Law, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 991, 993–94 (1989). 
 29. Geisinger & Stein, supra note 24, at 1062. 
 30. Id.; see, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 943, 968–72 (1995); Sunstein, supra note 20, at 2023.  See generally Elizabeth S. 
Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law:  A General Restatement, 148 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1503 (2000); Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 
585 (1998); Dhammika Dharmapala & Richard H. McAdams, The Condorcet Jury Theorem 
and the Expressive Function of Law:  A Theory of Informative Law, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 
1 (2003); Alex Geisinger, A Belief Change Theory of Expressive Law, 88 IOWA L. REV. 35 
6 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87 
“good” or acceptable behavior and what is “bad” or unacceptable 
behavior.31  People who internalize that message change their conduct.32  
For instance, antismoking laws changed public perceptions about 
smoking.33  With law’s help, smoking went from being viewed as 
sophisticated and exciting to undesirable and dangerous.34  Law shaped 
human behavior, reducing smoking rates over time.35 
Expressive law theory follows different versions and models.36  Most 
relevant to our analysis is what Richard McAdams calls the “expressive 
theory of law’s effects.”37  Law shapes attitudes, beliefs, and behavior 
through its messages and lessons.38  Various mechanisms operate to 
achieve this effect, which we will categorize as “informational” or “action-
focusing.”39 
Scholarship has mostly focused on law as an informational mechanism.40  
Under this view, law provides information about how people should act.41  
It signals what behavior is valuable and desired and what behavior is 
destructive and denigrated.  As McAdams explains, “democratically 
produced” laws are “positively correlated with popular attitudes.”42  Law’s 
form (civil or criminal) and penalty show societal intensity around a social 
value.43  Law may reflect a preexisting consensus or a shift to a new 
consensus about certain activity.44 
 
(2002) [hereinafter Geisinger, A Belief]; Alex Geisinger & Ivan E. Bodensteiner, An 
Expressive Jurisprudence of the Establishment Clause, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. 77 (2007); 
Alex Geisinger, Reconceiving the Internal and Social Enforcement Effects of Expressive 
Regulation, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. ONLINE 1 (2016); Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, 
Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV 349 (1997); Richard H. McAdams, A Focal 
Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649 (2000); Richard H. McAdams, An 
Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 339 (2000) [hereinafter McAdams, An 
Attitudinal Theory]. 
 31. See Geisinger & Stein, supra note 24, at 1062; Sunstein, supra note 20, at 2022, 
2035–36, 2050–52. 
 32. Geisinger & Stein, supra note 24, at 1062; Sunstein, supra note 20, at 2022. 
 33. See Geisinger & Stein, supra note 24, at 1062. 
 34. See id. 
 35. See id. 
 36. Id. at 1063–64; see, e.g., Feldman, supra note 23, at 179 (describing the various 
models of expressive law theory and its mechanisms); Ryo, supra note 23, at 106–07 
(summarizing multiple theories and research). 
 37. MCADAMS, supra note 27, at 13–16. 
 38. Ryo, supra note 23, at 106–07; see also Sunstein, supra note 20, at 2031. 
 39. McAdams largely focuses on these mechanisms but refers to the latter as 
“coordination.”  We treat this category as a bit broader than coordination, though we owe 
much of our insights to McAdams’s important analysis. See MCADAMS, supra note 27, at 6.  
Other work discusses these issues in varying ways. See, e.g., Feldman, supra note 23, at 
181–86 (describing four mechanisms); Geisinger & Stein, supra note 24, at 1068–70 
(summarizing various expressive law theories with different mechanisms); Ryo, supra note 
23, at 106–07 (describing two categories, though slightly differently). 
 40. Geisinger & Stein, supra note 24, at 1067–68. 
 41. Id. 
 42. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory, supra note 30, at 340. 
 43. Feldman, supra note 23, at 184–85. 
 44. Id. 
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Different explanations are offered for how law’s expressive value alters 
behavior.  For some, law allows people to infer facts about the social costs 
of conduct.45  Matching one’s actions to public sentiment enables people to 
avoid the social costs of behaving in ways that would garner disapproval, or 
worse.46  Another explanation is that people gradually internalize 
information about societal norms.47  People change their beliefs and 
attitudes because they prefer to act in ways that reflect the majority’s views.  
This change may reflect a belief that obeying the law is a moral 
imperative.48 
Now, to the law’s action-focusing mechanism.  In a phenomenon 
described by McAdams as “coordination,” law provides a “focal point” 
around which individuals organize their behavior.49  Legally mandated stop 
lights, for instance, enable people to coordinate their driving and avoid 
accidents.50  Moreover, law serves as a focal point for social change.51  
When public sentiment about specific behavior is unclear, law provides 
expressive clarity, and channels shifts in beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors.52 
Law’s informational and action-focusing mechanisms work together.  
Take laws that require dog owners to clean up after their animals.53  On 
nearly every block in Dublin, one finds “Bin the Poo” signs.54  Countless 
cities and towns all over the world have similar warnings.  Although such 
laws are rarely enforced, they achieve substantial compliance.55  Law 
generates compliance by signaling societal disapproval for the failure to 
clean up and by encouraging people to press others to clean up, creating a 
“focal point” for non–dog owners to coordinate action.56  The confluence of 
these mechanisms causes “norm cascades.”57  This embodies a basic 
premise of social psychology—that when deciding how to act, people 
consider how the wider group would perceive their actions.58 
B.  In Operation 
Expressive theory has deepened our understanding of shifting social 
norms around the unequal treatment of women of all races, sexual 
 
 45. Geisinger, A Belief, supra note 30, at 47 n.77. 
 46. Geisinger, A Belief, supra note 30, at 39–40, 47 (noting legal sanctions beyond mere 
societal disapproval); Geisinger & Stein, supra note 24, at 1068. 
 47. Geisinger, A Belief, supra note 30, at 47. 
 48. Id. at 64–65. 
 49. MCADAMS, supra note 27, at 5; see also Ryo, supra note 23, at 106. 
 50. MCADAMS, supra note 27, at 5. 
 51. Geisinger, A Belief, supra note 30, at 46–47. 
 52. See id. at 64–65. 
 53. MCADAMS, supra note 27, at 197; Sunstein, supra note 20, at 2032. 
 54. On a trip to Dublin, one of us (Citron) took countless photos of the “Bin the Poo” 
signs—the signs were far more interesting than the ones in the United States, especially to 
her then-teenage daughters. 
 55. See MCADAMS, supra note 27, at 197; Sunstein, supra note 20, at 2032. 
 56. See MCADAMS, supra note 27, at 197; Sunstein, supra note 20, at 2032. 
 57. Sunstein, supra note 20, at 2033. 
 58. See Geisinger, A Belief, supra note 30, at 47; McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory, 
supra note 30, at 340. 
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orientations, national origins, and religions.59  In the 1970s and 1980s, 
judicial rulings changed the social meaning of workplace sexual harassment 
from a triviality to gender discrimination.60  Class action lawsuits brought 
by advocates in the battered women’s movement changed law 
enforcement’s view of domestic violence from a “private family matter” to 
a criminal act warranting arrest and prosecution.61 
Law has helped change social attitudes toward cyberharassment of 
women and marginalized communities.  As with workplace sexual 
harassment and domestic violence, a “cyber civil rights” approach altered 
the social meaning of cyberharassment from “no big deal” to grave social 
problem.62  Changes in the law galvanized public sentiment, anti-
harassment organizations,63 privacy groups,64 and social media 
companies65 to coordinate efforts for broader social change.66 
 
 59. One of us (Citron) has used expressive theory to explain how law has the potential to 
shift social norms around online abuse, just as it has in the past regarding domestic violence 
and workplace sexual harassment. See CITRON, supra note 8, at 126–27; Citron, supra note 
17, at 377. 
 60. Citron, supra note 17, at 407–08. 
 61. Id. at 409; see also Avlana K. Eisenberg, Criminal Inflictions of Emotional Distress, 
113 MICH. L. REV. 607, 609 (2015) (using expressive theory, among other theories, to help 
explain various criminal law reforms aimed at empowering victims); Ari Ezra Waldman, A 
Breach of Trust:  Fighting Nonconsensual Pornography, 102 IOWA L. REV. 709, 719–20, 
730–31 (2017). 
 62. In 2008, one of us (Citron) was the first to argue that cyberharassment constituted a 
civil rights problem and to offer a civil rights framework to address it. See generally Citron, 
supra note 18.  For further discussion, see also Citron, supra note 17, at 377; and Danielle 
Citron, Yale ISP—Reputation Economies in Cyberspace, YOUTUBE (Jan. 8, 2008), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XVEL4RfN3uQ [https://perma.cc/KG8P-WKFE].  
Mary Anne Franks has been an exemplary thinker and contributor in this effort. See 
generally Franks, supra note 8; Mary Anne Franks, Unwilling Avatars:  Idealism and 
Discrimination in Cyberspace, 20 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 224 (2011).  For years, online 
commenters and free speech absolutists dismissed that work as an overreaction to a small 
problem. Citron, supra note 17, at 410–11.  See generally Danielle Keats Citron, Online 
Engagement on Equal Terms, 95 B.U. L. REV. ANNEX 97 (2015).  As the problem of online 
abuse became more widespread, as it became clear that women and marginalized 
communities were the majority of victims, and as victims suffered serious consequences to 
their ability to work, speak, engage, and socialize, lawmakers and law enforcers began to 
pay attention. CITRON, supra note 8, at 95–120. 
 63. See CITRON, supra note 8, at 106, 252 (describing the advocacy work of the Cyber 
Civil Rights Initiative (CCRI), Jacobs, and Franks, and the role that Franks and CCRI played 
in changing the law regarding nonconsensual pornography). 
 64. For instance, the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), the oldest privacy 
advocacy group in the United States, has strongly supported the work of CCRI and 
advocates fighting nonconsensual pornography.  Carrie Goldberg, who has served on 
CCRI’s Board of Directors for years and whose legal practice is devoted to victims of online 
abuse, received EPIC’s Champion of Freedom Award in 2016. Press Release, Elec. Privacy 
Info. Ctr., EPIC Gives Freedom Awards to Goldberg, Kasparov, Rivest, and Wald (June 5, 
2017), http://epic.org/2017/06/epic-gives-freedom-awards-to-g.html [http://perma.cc/LZQ3-
GB8R]. 
 65. One of us (Citron) sits on Twitter’s Trust and Safety Council and serves on 
Facebook’s Nonconsensual Intimate Imagery Task Force.  Citron does not receive 
compensation for that work. The Twitter Trust and Safety Council, TWITTER, 
https://about.twitter.com/ 
en_us/safety/safety-partners.html [https://perma.cc/7KRV-S5B8] (last visited Feb. 23, 
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The work of the Cyber Civil Rights Initiative (CCRI);67 its founder Holly 
Jacobs, a victim of nonconsensual pornography; and its legislative adviser 
and now-President Mary Anne Franks was crucial in this effort.  Franks 
wrote the first model nonconsensual pornography law.68  At that time, only 
three states criminalized the practice.69  Thanks to Franks’s thoughtful 
scholarship and tireless work with lawmakers, forty-one states and the 
District of Columbia now criminalize the posting of nude images without 
consent.70 
Given changes in the law brought about by the hard work of advocates, 
law enforcement began to tackle online abuse.  An important step was 
education.  In 2014, one of us (Citron) worked with U.S. Senator Kamala 
Harris, then the California attorney general (AG), to establish the Cyber 
Exploitation Task Force.71  The Task Force was made up of victim 
advocates, fifty major technology companies, law enforcement 
representatives, and experts.  Under Harris’s leadership, California created 
an online hub providing resources for law enforcement officers 
investigating invasions of sexual privacy, harassment, and stalking.72 
There has been an increase in the enforcement of criminal law and civil 
actions related to online abuse.  The California AG’s office prosecuted 
operators of revenge porn websites for engaging in extortion and other 
crimes.  Site operators were convicted of, or pleaded guilty to, encouraging 
users to post nude photos of their ex-partners and charging hundreds of 
dollars for the photos to be removed.73  The Department of Justice’s 
Computer Crimes and Intellectual Property Section has prosecutors like 
Mona Sedky with an expertise in cyberstalking, cyberharassment, and 
 
2019); see also Madeline Buxton, Facebook Wants to Stop Revenge Porn Before It Begins, 
but the Process Is Tricky, REFINERY29 (May 22, 2018, 11:00 AM), 
https://www.refinery29.com/en-us/2018/05/199800/facbook-fights-revenge-porn 
[https://perma.cc/3MPS-ADXV]. 
 66. Citron, supra note 17, at 410–11. 
 67. CYBER C.R. INITIATIVE, https://www.cybercivilrights.org/ [https://perma.cc/5JB8-
WJEW] (last visited Feb. 21, 2019). 
 68. Citron, supra note 11 (manuscript at 57 n.412). 
 69. Mary Anne Franks, “Revenge Porn” Reform:  A View from the Front Lines, 69 FLA. 
L. REV. 1251, 1280 (2017). 
 70. Citron, supra note 11 (manuscript at 57). 
 71. See Press Release, State of Cal. Dept. of Justice, Att’y Gen. Kamala D. Harris, Tech 
Leaders and Advocates Launch Offensive in Fight Against Cyber Exploitation (Oct. 14, 
2015), https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-kamala-d-harris-tech-leaders-
and-advocates-launch-offensive [https://perma.cc/N4DP-KNCQ]. 
 72. See id. 
 73. For instance, the operator of UGotPosted, Kevin Bollaert, faced charges of extortion, 
conspiracy, and identity theft for allegedly urging users to post their ex-lovers’ nude photos 
and then demanding large fees for the removal of each photo. Citron, supra note 62, at 98 
n.6.  Bollaert’s conviction signaled that extorting money from individuals whose 
confidential nude images were posted without permission is an illegal enterprise. Danielle 
Citron & Woodrow Hartzog, The Decision That Could Finally Kill the Revenge-Porn 
Business, ATLANTIC (Feb. 3, 2015), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/02/the-decision-that-could-finally-
kill-the-revenge-porn-business/385113/ [https://perma.cc/JH87-GH4L]. 
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sextortion.74  The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) followed California’s 
lead by bringing an enforcement action against revenge porn site operators 
for exploiting nude images shared in confidence for commercial gain.75 
There has been a significant shift in the response to online abuse; in ten 
years, cyberharassment went from a triviality to a crime.76  Attorneys 
general like Harris devoted resources to training personnel to conduct 
investigations of online abuse.77  Social media companies banned 
nonconsensual pornography, threats, and other forms of cyberharassment.78  
Victims, slowly but surely, felt emboldened to report online abuse to law 
enforcement. 
In January 2015, the esteemed civil liberties group, the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation (EFF), put its reputation behind efforts to combat 
cyberharassment.  The EFF wrote an article highlighting online harassment 
as a pressing “digital rights issue.”79  It was a big deal for a civil liberties 
group to recognize that speech can silence speech.80  In our experience, 
most civil liberties groups resist that argument.  The EFF said to the public 
that cyberharassment was not a small problem that could be ignored.81  
Instead, the EFF made clear that cyberharassment was “profoundly 
damaging to the free speech and privacy rights of the people targeted.”82  It 
was crucial for the public’s understanding of online abuse for a civil 
liberties organization to contend that online abuse silences people, 
especially women and minorities, who enjoy “less political or social 
power.”83  Such progress has been slow but sure. 
C.  Little-Noticed Expressive Effect:  Victim Engagement 
There is another, little-studied impact that law has in the arena of online 
abuse:  the empowerment of victims to speak and engage online.  Though 
largely neglected in expressive law scholarship,84 the idea that law has the 
potential to empower the speech of victims is not new.  This has been a core 
 
 74. See Citron, supra note 11 (manuscript at 55 n.396). 
 75. Citron, supra note 62, at 98. 
 76. Citron, supra note 17, at 410–11. 
 77. Id. at 411–12. 
 78. One of us (Citron) has worked closely with social media companies on their terms-
of-service policies related to online abuse. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
 79. Danny O’Brien & Dia Kiyyali, Facing the Challenge of Online Harassment, 
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Jan. 8, 2015), http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/01/ 
facing-challenge-online-harassment [https://perma.cc/24TU-EBAK]. 
 80. Citron, supra note 62, at 99. 
 81. See O’Brien & Kiyyali, supra note 79. 
 82. Id. 
 83. See id. 
 84. We have raised this issue previously. See Jonathon W. Penney, Can Cyber 
Harassment Laws Encourage Online Speech?, in PERSPECTIVES ON HARMFUL SPEECH 
ONLINE: 10, 10 (Urs Gasser et al. eds., 2017), http://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/ 
1/33746096/2017-08_harmfulspeech.pdf [https://perma.cc/9NPZ-KFG8]; see also Citron, 
supra note 17, at 412 (“[T]argeted individuals would be more likely to come forward since 
reporting such incidents would not seem fruitless.  This would have a salutary psychic effect 
on women:  they would no longer view themselves as defenseless.”). 
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objective of the victim’s rights movement.  Since the 1970s, advocates have 
sought to give victims a greater “voice” in the criminal justice system.85  As 
we have both argued, law’s expressive value includes its encouragement of 
cyberharassment victims to report abuse to law enforcement.86 
There has been good reason to be skeptical of this argument.  Until 
recently, expressive law scholarship has been rich in theory, but light on 
empirical studies substantiating and exploring its varied dimensions.87  
Studies showing how law’s expressive effects happen, how often, and the 
scope of the change are crucial.  The next Part helps fill that void by 
substantiating our theoretical arguments with original empirical research. 
II.  LAW’S EMPOWERMENT OF SPEECH 
Cyberharassment laws are often criticized for chilling speech.88  In this 
Part, we make the theoretical and empirical case that law does the opposite:  
cyberharassment law is more likely to encourage speech than to chill it. 
This Part first discusses the theoretical implications of law’s expressive 
potential to empower speech.  Then, it presents the results of original 
empirical research conducted by one of us (Penney). 
A.  Expressive Theory 
As we show below, the law’s expressive value extends to victims.  It 
makes clear that the democratic majority disapproves of efforts to silence 
and intimidate victims.  It says that the public values victims’ online 
 
 85. Different legal reforms initiated in response to the victim’s rights movement, like 
victim impact statements, have been justified as having important expressive meaning for 
victims—that they matter in the criminal justice system and need a stronger voice. 
Eisenberg, supra note 61, at 620; see also Aiken & Goldwasser, supra note 21, at 147 
(discussing criminal law reforms aimed at giving victims back their “voice”). 
 86. See JoAnne Sweeny & John Slack, Sexting as ‘Sexual Behavior’ Under Rape Shield 
Laws, 11 INT’L J. CYBER CRIMINOLOGY 246, 247 (2017) (noting that to address the “trend” of 
cyberbulling and cyberharassment, legislatures across the country “began adopting 
legislation to encourage victims to report these kinds of crimes”). 
 87. See Feldman, supra note 23, at 181–86; Ryo, supra note 23, at 101; Yeh, supra note 
23, at 174. 
 88. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Challenge to Maryland Law Banning Speech That 
Intentionally Seriously Distresses Minors, WASH. POST:  VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 29, 
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/06/29/challenge-
to-maryland-law-banning-speech-that-intentionally-seriously-distresses-minors/ 
[https://perma.cc/XD5E-HNYA].  See generally Michal Buchhandler-Raphael, 
Overcriminalizing Speech, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1667 (2015).  One of us (Citron) and Mary 
Anne Franks have argued together and separately that this argument fails to recognize how 
online abuse silences speech. See CITRON, supra note 8, at 27; Citron, supra note 18, at 102; 
Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not Break:  Denying Bad 
Samaritans § 230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 401, 420 n.135 (2017); Citron, supra note 
62, at 100; Franks, supra note 69, at 1295, 1311, 1321–22  (noting that First Amendment 
fundamentalists often critique laws and ordinances that regulate speech as having a chilling 
effect on protected speech); Franks, supra note 8, at 697; Franks, supra note 62, at 243.  
Mary Anne Franks’s new book is a tour de force on First Amendment fundamentalism, with 
a focus on online abuse. See generally MARY ANNE FRANKS, THE CULT OF THE 
CONSTITUTION (forthcoming 2019). 
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contributions.  And it signals that behavior intending to drive victims 
offline is unacceptable.  Victims infer from the law that their online 
engagement is valued and that their suffering matters to the public.  They 
internalize these messages, leading them to engage more online over time.  
They feel emboldened to come forward and tell their stories. 
We have seen this happen.  In 2012, Holly Jacobs stopped using a 
pseudonym to speak to the press  about her experience with nonconsensual 
pornography.89  She reclaimed her online life and started a nonprofit 
organization, the Cyber Civil Rights Initiative, devoted to combating online 
abuse.90 
When Holly Jacobs founded CCRI along with Mary Anne Franks, the 
only other anti-harassment advocacy groups were Without My Consent 
(WMC) and National Network to End Domestic Violence (NNEDV), which 
had long fought against the abuse of digital technologies.91  In the past two 
years, CCRI, WMC, and NNEDV have been joined by other activists and 
groups, such as Women Against Revenge Porn, the Badass Army, and the 
March Against Revenge Porn.92 
Law serves to coordinate action that increases victims’ inclination to 
engage online.  It provides a “focal point” for victims to connect with others 
interested in organizing to shift social norms.  It helps individuals organize 
action to fight abuse online.  For the past six years, advocacy groups have 
coordinated their efforts to combat online abuse.93  CCRI and WMC have 
drafted joint comments to the FTC.94  They have also engaged in online 
campaigns.95  In addition, advocates actively participate in email listservs 
 
 89. CITRON, supra note 8, at 105. 
 90. Jacobs has been celebrated for her brave and tireless work, and rightly so.  In 2018, 
she was named one of ten “Women of Worth” by L’Oreal. Press Release, L’Oreal Paris, 
L’Oréal Paris Honors Extraordinary Women of Worth at 13th Annual Celebration; Christy 
Silva of Aidan’s Heart Foundation Named National Honoree and Jaha Dukureh of Safe 
Hands for Girls Honored as 2018 Karen T. Fondu Impact Award Winner (Dec. 6, 2018), 
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/loreal-paris-honors-extraordinary-women-of-
worth-at-13th-annual-celebration-christy-silva-of-aidans-heart-foundation-named-national-
honoree-and-jaha-dukureh-of-safe-hands-for-girls-honored-as-2018-karen-t-fondu-impact-
award-wi-300760168.html [https://perma.cc/KV5H-LM9W]. 
 91. See CITRON, supra note 8, at 95–119. 
 92. See, e.g., Joseph Cox, The ‘Badass Army’ is Training Revenge Porn Victims to Fight 
Back, VICE:  MOTHERBOARD (Mar. 14, 2018, 8:00 AM), 
https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/ 
article/59k7qx/revenge-porn-what-to-do-badass-army-anon-ib [https://perma.cc/82KB-
Q8KL].  CCRI has also coordinated with anti-online-abuse groups outside the United States, 
including in South Korea and the United Kingdom. 
 93. One of us (Citron) served as one of the original board members of CCRI and 
remains on the board to this day.  Citron also serves as an adviser to Without My Consent 
(WMC).  For a history of the development of CCRI and WMC, see generally CITRON, supra 
note 8, at 95–119. 
 94. Comments of the Cyber Civil Rights Initiative, Inc. and Without My Consent. Inc. to 
the Federal Trade Commission, Craig Brittain, FTC File No. 132 3120 (Feb. 23, 2015), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_comments/2015/02/00007-93359.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/QL53-9GLG]. 
 95. See id. at 1–2. 
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devoted to combating online harassment.96  Elisa D’Amico and David 
Bateman have contributed to these efforts by spearheading a pro bono 
project, the Cyber Civil Rights Legal Project, at their firm K&L Gates.97 
In short, law signals a tipping point for social norms that disapprove of 
online abuse.  As we demonstrate below, law has the potential to lead to 
more speech and engagement online, contributing to even more profound 
shifts in social norms.  This could mean more contributions and 
engagement by victims online.  The next section provides empirical 
evidence to support this proposition. 
B.  Empirical Support 
Here we offer important empirical support for our theoretical 
propositions.  For this analysis and the empirical study discussed below, we 
assume the existence of a cyberharassment law imposing tough civil and 
criminal penalties for online conduct intended to terrorize or harass another 
person.  As explored above, such a law would signal that cyberharassment 
is sufficiently harmful to warrant criminal and civil penalties. 
One of us (Penney) has done significant empirical work on the chilling 
effect in different related contexts.98  For this Article, Penney conducted an 
original study that supports the supposition that cyberharassment law can 
encourage victims to speak and engage online.  The study involved an 
online survey of over 1200 American internet users.99  It examined 
 
 96. One of us (Citron) is a member of an online harassment email listserv, which brings 
together activists from various advocacy groups, victims, and journalists.  The listserv has 
been in operation for the past five years. 
 97. CYBER C.R. LEGAL PROJECT, https://www.cyberrightsproject.com/ [https://perma.cc/ 
P8HK-6Y5N] (last visited Feb. 21, 2019). 
 98. See generally JONATHON W. PENNEY, CHILLING EFFECTS:  UNDERSTANDING THE 
IMPACT OF SURVEILLANCE AND OTHER DIGITAL THREATS (forthcoming 2020); Penney, 
Chilling Effects, supra note 14 (documenting chilling effects associated with the awareness 
of online government surveillance); Jonathon W. Penney, Copyright’s Media Theory and the 
Internet:  The Case of the Chilling Effects Doctrine, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY FOR THE 
21ST CENTURY:  INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACHES 481 (B. Courtney Doagoo et al. eds., 
2014); Jonathon W. Penney, The Cycles of Global Telecommunication Censorship and 
Surveillance, 36 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 693 (2015) (not explicitly examining the idea of “chilling 
effects,” but using historical case studies to explore similar impacts, including how 
international censorship and surveillance chilled or deterred certain state practices and the 
development of telecommunications technologies, such as how cable surveillance changed 
how states and businesses communicated via the global telegraph system); Penney, Internet 
Surveillance, supra note 14 (describing the chilling effects associated with a range of 
regulatory activities, including state and corporate surveillance, and exploring differential 
impacts among different groups); Jonathon W. Penney, Privacy, Chilling Effects, and 
Personalized Legal Automation:  The DMCA as an Empirical Case Study, 22 STAN. TECH. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2019) (discussing an empirical case study documenting and exploring 
chilling effects associated with algorithmic legal enforcement online); Jonathon W. Penney, 
Three Chilling Effects Paradigms and Transatlantic Privacy, 25 EUR. L.J. (forthcoming 
2019) (documenting chilling effects theory, research, and understanding through three 
research paradigms). 
 99. The 1296 total survey responses were collected in March 2015, with sixty-four 
survey responses excluded for being substantially incomplete (defined by ten or more 
questions left unanswered—many of these were likely false starts by respondents), another 
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participants’ responses to various hypothetical “regulatory” scenarios, 
including one where the participant learns that the government has enacted 
a new law introducing tough civil and criminal penalties for posting 
information or other content online with the intent to harass or intimidate 
another person.100 
As noted in Part I, one of the primary critiques of cyberharassment laws 
is that they have a chilling effect on speech.  The survey attempted to 
explore any possible chilling effect on the participants’ online activities (or 
lack thereof) across a range of categories, including time spent online, 
online speech, sharing of personally created content, online searches, and 
social network site engagement, as well as privacy concerns.  The study 
also tested whether awareness of the cyberharassment law would work to 
encourage participants to speak, share, contribute, and engage more online. 
Survey respondents were recruited using an online platform, which has 
yielded samples relatively representative of the U.S. internet-using 
population.101  Responses were compiled and statistically analyzed in 
relation to a range of demographic factors and reported traits, including age, 
gender, education and income level, amount of time spent online, level of 
online sharing, level of social network engagement, and privacy concerns in 
response to the law.102 
The results offered a number of insights.  First, contrary to what many 
civil libertarians argue, cyberharassment laws would have more salutary 
than chilling effects for online engagement.  For instance, 87 percent of 
respondents indicated that a cyberharassment law would have “no impact” 
or render them “somewhat more likely” or “much more likely” to “spend 
time on the internet,” 62 percent indicated that such a law would have “no 
impact” or render them “more likely” to “speak or write about certain topics 
 
eighteen excluded for being completed too quickly, and two more screened because the 
respondents had completed a version of the survey previously (in a field test). 
 100. For more extensive information on research design and methodology, see generally 
Penney, Internet Surveillance, supra note 14. 
 101. Amazon’s Mechanical Turk provides an open crowdsourcing platform for task 
creation, recruitment, compensation, and data collection.  It has been used and validated as a 
tool for a broad range of empirical, experimental, and behavioral studies. Gabriele Paolacci 
& Jesse Chandler, Inside the Turk:  Understanding Mechanical Turk as a Participant Pool, 
23 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 184, 186 (2014); Gabriele Paolacci, Jesse Chandler 
& Panagiotis G. Ipeirotis, Running Experiments on Amazon Mechanical Turk, 5 JUDGMENT 
& DECISION MAKING 411, 411–12 (2010); Panos G. Ipeirotis, Turker Demographics vs 
Internet Demographics, COMPUTER SCIENTIST BUS. SCH. (Mar. 16, 2009), 
http://www.behind-the-enemy-lines.com/2009/03/turker-demographics-vs-internet.html 
[http://perma.cc/ALZ9-GGLS] 
 102. In the survey case study, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, a common 
statistical method for analyzing survey data, was used to statistically analyze findings, as it 
allowed for all relevant variables to be controlled in order to isolate relationships. STEVEN G. 
HEERINGA, BRADY T. WEST & PATRICIA A. BERGLUND, APPLIED SURVEY DATA ANALYSIS 
195, 235 (2d ed. 2017).  Cohen’s f 2 was also used to test the effect size of findings, using the 
conventional interpretation of small (0.02), medium (0.15), and large (0.35) values. JACOB 
COHEN, STATISTICAL POWER ANALYSIS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 413–14 (2d ed. 
1988); TIMOTHY Z. KEITH, MULTIPLE REGRESSION AND BEYOND:  AN INTRODUCTION TO 
MULTIPLE REGRESSION AND STRUCTURAL EQUATION MODELING 62–63 (3d ed. 2019). 
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online.”  Sixty-seven percent indicated that the law would have “no impact” 
or would render them “somewhat more likely” or “much more likely” to 
share personally created content online, and 56 percent indicated that the 
law would either have “no impact” or would render them “more likely” to 
contribute to social networks online. 
In short, there was little evidence to support claims that the law would 
have substantial or significant chilling effects for online activities.  
Respondents did largely agree (69 percent) with a statement that the law 
would make them “more careful” about what they said in certain contexts 
online, though more carefulness and thoughtfulness in online speech and 
sharing is arguably not an undesirable outcome given present issues with 
polarization, extreme rhetoric, and disinformation.103 
Second, the law had a clear salutary impact on women’s online 
contributions, sharing, and engagement.  Female participants in the 
survey—the predominant targets or victims of cyberharassment—said that 
they were more likely to engage online in response to the cyberharassment 
law.104  There was a statistically significant gender effect in response to the 
proposed law, as seen in the findings set out in Table 1 below. 
  
 
 103. See, e.g., Daniel J. Coffey, Michael Kohler & Douglas M. Granger, Sparking 
Debate:  Campaigns, Social Media, and Political Incivility, in CONTROLLING THE MESSAGE:  
NEW MEDIA IN AMERICAN POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS 245 (Victoria A. Farrar-Myers & Justin S. 
Vaughn eds., 2015); Eric C. Miller, Book Review, 51 ARGUMENTATION & ADVOC. 132, 132 
(2014) (reviewing JOSEPH ZOMPETTI, DIVISIVE DISCOURSE:  THE EXTREME RHETORIC OF 
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN POLITICS (2015)); Mark Richens, Want the Internet to Be Less 
Mean?  Think Before You Share, WIS. PUB. RADIO (Dec. 22, 2018, 10:30 AM), 
http://www.wpr.org/want-internet-be-less-mean-think-you-share [http://perma.cc/BZ7Y-
XZAR]; Nick Robins-Early, How to Recognize a Fake News Story, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 
27, 2016, 11:58 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.ca/entry/fake-news-guide-
facebook_us_5831c6aae4b058ce7aaba169 [https://perma.cc/S2JA-ETB3]. 
 104. The study included 608 female participants and 600 male participants.  Four 
respondents skipped this specific question. 
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Table 1:  Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Regression Results Predicting 
Respondents Being More Likely to Spend Time, Discuss, Share Personally 
Created Content, or Engage with Social Networks Online in Response to 
New Cyberharassment Law (Regression Coefficient with Standard Errors 
in Parenthesis)105 
Predictor 
More Likely to 
Spend Time 
Online 
More Likely to 
Speak About 
Certain Topics 
Online 
More Likely to 
Share Online 
More Likely to 
Contribute to 
Social 
Networks 
Age 0.08(0.03)*** 0.01(0.04) 0.00(0.03) 0.00(0.04) 
Gender 0.15(0.04)*** 0.07(0.05) 0.12(0.05)** 0.15(0.06)** 
Education 
Level 
-0.00(0.03) 0.00(0.04) 0.03(0.04) -0.04(0.04) 
Income 
Level 
-0.10(0.02) 0.00(0.02) -0.01(0.02) -0.00(0.02) 
Internet 
Usage Level 
0.03(0.03) 0.00(0.04) 0.04(0.04) -0.07(0.04) 
Online 
Sharing 
-0.03(0.02) -0.01(0.03) -0.03(0.03) -0.03(0.03) 
Social 
Network 
Engagement 
0.00(0.02) 0.02(0.02) 0.01(0.02) 0.06(0.02) 
Privacy 
Concerns 
-0.11(0.02)*** -0.19(0.02)*** -0.24(0.02)*** -0.29(0.02)*** 
 
Given the way the gender variable was coded, these findings show that 
women were statistically more likely to increase online engagement in light 
of the law by three of the four engagement measures.  They were more 
likely to spend time online, more likely to share personally created or 
authored content online, and more likely to contribute to social network 
sites online.  Though there was no gender effect for the “speech” 
engagement measure (more or less likely to “speak or write online about 
certain topics” in response to the law), this may be due to the fact that the 
hypothetical law in the scenario facilitated the speech of both women and 
men.  It might also be a product of some women in the survey, especially 
those who have experienced online harassment in the past, interpreting the 
question in slightly different ways given its open-ended nature.106  
Speaking more “about certain topics” online could include a variety of 
subject matter, including those that may intimidate or harass. 
 
 105. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.  All models significant (Prob > F = 0.00) with 
medium and near medium effect sizes (Cohen’s f 2). All statistically significant results are 
highlighted in bold. 
 106. Participants were asked, “Would this new law make you more likely or less likely to 
speak or write about certain topics online?” 
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Nevertheless, the potential salutary effect on women’s expression is clear 
from the gender effects for the other online engagement measures.  The 
results suggest a tough cyberharassment law would encourage women to 
share personally authored or created content online.  Such a law would thus 
encourage women’s contributions to social network sites.  All of this 
suggests that women are more likely to speak, engage, and express 
themselves online in light of a cyberharassment law. 
An additional takeaway from these findings is that those respondents 
with privacy concerns about the hypothetical law were more negatively 
impacted; they were statistically less likely to spend time online, speak, 
share, and contribute on social networks.  This suggests that women—who 
were statistically more likely to engage in these measures—did not 
predominantly indicate privacy concerns about the hypothetical law.  This 
is not surprising.  Given that women are disproportionately targeted by 
online harassment,107 which often includes serious privacy invasions, it 
makes sense that if they had any privacy concerns it would be about the 
harassment itself, not a law enacted to deter or prevent it.  These findings 
indicate that drafters of cyberharassment laws should take steps to allay 
privacy concerns—such as transparency about detection and enforcement—
to minimize or limit any incidental negative impacts or chilling effects, 
however modest. 
III.  IMPLICATIONS:  SEXUAL PRIVACY AND BEYOND 
Our argument that a cyberharassment law would have a salutary impact 
on victims’ speech is consistent with expressive law theory and supported 
by original empirical research.  Although a comprehensive discussion of the 
implications of expressive law impacts would take us beyond the scope of 
this Article, here we discuss a few likely benefits. 
A.  Expressive Empowerment 
A law with the effect of empowering and facilitating victim speech and 
engagement would have a positive psychological effect on victims.  
Victims would be more likely to speak out about their experiences and to 
report them to law enforcement.  These efforts would help legitimize past 
and future reform efforts and generate additional media attention to impact 
public sentiment, creating “norm cascades” that shift behavior in new 
directions.108 
The more victims speak out, the more victims who have retreated from 
online engagement might return.  A law that facilitates victim speech and 
engagement can help empower victims and, in the long term, prevent, 
mitigate, and reverse the negative impacts of online abuse and chilled 
speech.  Public discourse and broader democratic deliberation would be 
enriched, with a wider array of voices, contributions, and perspectives, 
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especially those from women and members of marginalized groups, who 
are most often targeted by online abuse.109 
Victims could speak out against online abuse, giving them a sense of 
empowerment that they have taken matters into their own hands.110  They 
could dispel myths and misinformation about the abuse they face.111  
Rather than speaking back to perpetrators (a risky proposition), victims’ 
supporters could generate positive support for targeted individuals.112  For 
example, as one of us (Citron) documented in Hate Crimes in Cyberspace, 
supporters of a feminist writer who was under assault online engaged in a 
counter “Google bomb” that successfully raised the prominence of her 
writings when searching for her name.113 
As law encourages victims to reengage online or to continue speaking, 
and as supporters speak out against online abuse, there will be enhanced 
online dialogue.114  Victims can encourage counterspeech from third parties 
using their resources and various forms of leverage.  For example, 
counterspeech by influential or high-profile people, or powerful private 
sector intermediaries—like social media platforms—are far better situated 
to affect and counter abusive activities.115 
B.  Implications for Sexual Privacy 
Laws tackling other forms of online abuse—such as invasions of sexual 
privacy—might have similar salutary effects on victims’ online 
engagement.116  Invasions of sexual privacy include different ways that 
people’s naked bodies and intimate activities are surveilled, recorded, 
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exposed, disclosed, and manipulated without permission.117  For instance, 
in a practice known as digital voyeurism, perpetrators secretly photograph 
or videotape people as they undress or engage in sexually explicit 
activities.118  Digital voyeurs further invade victims’ sexual privacy by 
distributing their sexually graphic images without consent.119  Yet another 
sexual-privacy invasion is sextortion—extortion or blackmail carried out 
online involving a threat to release sexually explicit images of the victim if 
the victim does not engage in further sexual activity.120 
Invasions of sexual privacy have a profound impact on victims who are 
denied agency over their intimate lives.  They suffer crushing anxiety and 
fear.121  They retreat from all aspects of on- and off-line life, including 
online expression.122  As one of us (Citron) argued with Mary Anne Franks, 
“[T]he nonconsensual disclosure of a person’s sexually explicit images 
chills private expression based on the fear that the images would be shared 
with the public at large.  Without any expectation of privacy and 
confidentiality, victims would not share their naked images.”123  Victims 
often hide the abuse from those who could help them.124  Victims of 
sextortion are explicitly told not to talk about the abuse or their attackers 
will release their nude images.125 
A Connecticut woman’s experience captures the way that sexual-privacy 
invasions undermine victims’ freedom.  After a woman discovered that her 
ex-boyfriend’s gifts contained recording devices, she had “recurrent and 
intrusive thoughts of being exposed and violated, [fear of] interference with 
her personal relationships, [and] feelings of vulnerability and mistrust.”126  
She explained that she “lives in a perpetual state of fear that someone is 
watching or spying on her and she does not feel safe anywhere.”127 
Given the profound harm of sexual-privacy invasions and their corrosive 
chilling effects on victims’ expression and freedom,128 sexual-privacy laws 
would have salutary effects on victim speech and engagement:  they would 
serve important speech-enhancing functions.  Comprehensive sexual-
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privacy legislation would signal broader public support for sexual-privacy 
victims and the value of their online speech, contributions, and engagement.  
Individuals and groups that have previously experienced sexual-privacy 
violations or abuses—most likely women and minorities—could infer that 
the majority values their online contributions, which would lead them to 
greater engagement.  They would thus be more likely to engage not only in 
online expression, but sexual expression with intimate partners as well. 
Though, as with expressive law scholarship more generally, further 
empirical and theoretical work needs to be done to substantiate and support 
these claims and hypotheses.  Such a law would be invaluable not only to 
our understanding of how law impacts behavior but also to better protect 
sexual privacy and the dignity of victims.129 
CONCLUSION 
This Article aims to reframe the debate about laws addressing online 
abuse.  We debunk the notion that online-harassment laws will do more 
damage than good to online expression.  As our study and arguments show, 
law is more likely to enhance speech than to chill it. 
Our argument strikes at the core of the themes of the Fordham Law 
Review’s Symposium on Gender Equality and the First Amendment for 
which we wrote and presented this piece.  Symposium participants raised 
concerns about how the internet’s freedom-enhancing potential was not 
being realized, especially for women and marginalized communities.  We 
offer this study as a sign of hope—both for what lawmakers, advocates, and 
law enforcers have accomplished and for what is possible in the future. 
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